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I. INTRODUCTION
As the number of people diagnosed with Acquired Immunological
Deficiency Syndrome (hereinafter AIDS) increases, so increases the potential
conflicts between those who have the disease and those who do not. One
conflict that has been prevalent during the last seven to ten years is the dispute
over whether to allow children with AIDS to attend public school in an
unrestricted setting. Few doubt the importance of education in America, but
1 Mr. Croasdell currently is clerking for Justice Richard E. Ransom of the New
Mexico Supreme Court. He received his B.A. in Political Science in 1990 from the
University of California, San Diego. He received his J.D. in 1993 from the University of
New Mexico School of Law.
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many believe that education is secondary to the interests of public safety.2
Should schools allow the risk of the possible transmission of AIDS from one
child to another by allowing AIDS-inflicted students to learn in an unrestricted
setting?
There have been several federal and state cases that have addressed this
problem and have, for the most part, required schools to allow students with
AIDS to attend in an unrestricted setting.3 The analysis in these cases is
troubling, however, because the courts have based their rulings on statutes or
on weak federal equal protection grounds.4 The right to free education seems
tenuously balanced against the will of the legislature. To strengthen the rights
of children with AIDS, courts must use different, more stable, bases to support
their legal analysis. The best support can be found in state constitutions. Every
state in the United States has a provision in its constitution that calls for the
protection of the right to education.5 Courts can use these provisions to enforce
the right of children with AIDS to a free public education.
The purpose of this article is to examine the problem that the American
public school system is facing with respect to children with AIDS. In addition,
this paper will examine how the courts are analyzing this issue and show why
the current trend of analysis is weaker than it should be. Finally, this paper will
look at how state constitutions are more frequently being used to protect
individual rights and how the state constitutions could be used to protect the
right of children with AIDS to free public education.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. AIDS in General
In 1981, the Center for Disease Control (hereinafter CDC) reported the first
known cases of AIDS.6 In its report, the CDC noted several cases in which
previously healthy homosexual men became inflicted with pneumonia or
2Certainly in some cases the interests of public safety definitely would outweigh
the importance of education, especially in cases in which allowing the child into the
school system would cause certain death to other children. The problem that arises
around children with AIDS, however, is that these children are banned from school
because of medically unsubstantiated fears, implying that the supposed interest in
public safety is, for the most part, irrational.
3 See, e.g., Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 381-82 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325,335-37
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
4 See, e.g., Thomas, 662 F. Supp. at 381-82 (holding that child with AIDS fell within
protection of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); District 27, 502 N.Y.S.2d at
337-38 (applying equal protection clause and finding no rational basis for exclusion of
children who are known carriers of AIDS).
5 See infra note 104.
6 See Anthony S. Fauci, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: An Update, 102
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 800 (1985).
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Kaposi's sarcoma, a rare skin cancer.7 Since that time, the reported number of
cases has skyrocketed; in 1993 alone, health departments reported 103,500 cases
of AIDS in persons ages 13 or older.8
The term AIDS is somewhat of a misnomer because it actually encompasses
several stages and deficiencies. 9 Under any name, the disease is deadly because
it invades healthy cells, reproduces itself, and destroys the host cell.10 Without
the healthy host cells, the immune system becomes dysfunctional making even
the commonest of colds life threatening.11
AIDS victims are typically classified into three different categories based
upon the stage of the disease and the symptoms. 12 Those individuals with fully
developed AIDS test HIV-positive and are inflicted with one or more of the
diseases that typically cause AIDS-related deaths. 13 In addition, these
individuals have multiple symptoms and severely impaired bodies. 14
Individuals with AIDS Related Complex (hereinafter ARC) are those who test
HIV-positive but who manifest less severe signs and symptoms of AIDS (such
as weight loss, chronic diarrhea, and lack of energy).15 Finally, individuals with
a seropositive infection test HIV-positive but have no symptoms of AIDS. These
individuals are not considered truly to have AIDS because their bodies have
not been attacked by any of the opportunistic diseases like Kaposi's sarcoma. 16
B. Children and AIDS
Although the percentage of children who fall into any of the three defining
categories is relatively small when compared to that number of persons
7Id.
8 Center for Disease Control, Update: Impact of the Expanded AIDS Surveillance Case
Definition for Adolescents and Adults on Case Reporting-United States, 1993, 13 JAMA 975
(1994).
9 See Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376,379 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(noting that the term AIDS encompassed the terms Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type
m1I (HTLV-Ill), Lymphodenopathy Associated Virus (LAV), and AIDS Associated
Retrovirus (ARV)). Other commentators include within the definition of AIDS the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). See Gretchen Martin, HIV/AIDS and
Adolescents: Implications for School Policies, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 325, 327 (1991).
10See Edna R. Vincent, Children with AIDS: Protecting Their Rights in the Classroom
Through the Arline Decision and Department of Education Enforcement of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 2 ADMI. LJ. 391, 396 (1988).
11id.
12 See id.; Maureen Ann MacFarlane, Equal Opportunities: Protecting the Rights of
AIDS-Linked Children in the Classroom, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 380 (1989).
B3 Vincent, supra note 10, at 396.
141d.
15M.
161d. at 397.
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actually infected with the virus,17 the number of persons under the age of
nineteen who have contracted the disease is astonishing.18 As of 1993 more
than 4,000 children (ages under thirteen) and 1,000 adolescents (ages thirteen
to nineteen) have been diagnosed with AIDS and at least 10,000 more children
have been infected with the HIV virus.19 Experts assert that for every reported
case of a child with AIDS, three to five more cases will go unreported.20
With these statistics in mind, it is not hard to imagine the nightmare that
school administrators have to go through in trying to deal with the problem.
For every child with AIDS, there is a school system that has to try to
accommodate him or her. What is probably worse, however, is that for every
school system that tries to accommodate children with AIDS, there are
numerous parents and interest groups who, out of fear for their children's
safety, would pull their children from the system rather than run the risk of
their children contracting the AIDS virus.
Parental and societal fears21 spark the debate over what to do with the
children who have been inflicted with the virus. On one side, parents and
society fear that their healthy children will become infected. The state has a
police power/public health duty to protect these parents' interests. On the
other side, children with AIDS have a right and a need to be educated in the
least restrictive setting possible. The state has a duty to make sure the children's
interests are protected.
At the end of the debate the school administrators are basically left with
three options.22 The most drastic measure is to ban children with AIDS from
17See Myra S. Chickering, AIDS in the Classroom: A New Perspective on Educating
School-Age Children Infected with HIV, 9 REV. LITIG. 149, 155 (1990).
18 Some scientists have projected that there are as many as 10,000 to 20,000 cases of
children with AIDS in the United States. See Susan A. Winchell, Discrimination in the
Public Schools: Dick and Jane Have AIDS, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881, 881 (1988).
19 Russell B. Van Dyke, Pediatric Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection and the
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: A Progress Report, AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN, May
1993, at 524.
20Chickering, supra note 17, at 155.
21One commentator has stated that "[m]uch of the fear and differential treatment
surrounding AIDS is grounded on misinformation concerning how the disease is
transmitted." Vincent, supra note 10, at 393. Another commentator pointed out that a
recent poll showed that over one-half of the American public believes AIDS can be
transmitted through casual contact, despite strong medical evidence to the contrary.
Lisa J. Sotto, Comment, Undoing a Lesson of Fear in the Classroom: The Legal Recourse of
AIDS-Linked Children, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 193,193 (1986). In Queens, New York, concerned
parents did in fact keep their children away from the public schools in protest of the
New York public school's policy of admitting children with AIDS. See Faye A. Silas, Is
School For All?, 71 A.B.AJ. 18 (Nov. 1985).
22 Martin, supra note 9, at 332.
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attending school.23 These children are forced to study at home or find another
school that will allow them to attend-either way the children are left feeling
ostracized and unwanted. Another option would be to allow the children to
attend public school but quarantine them rather than admitting them into
classes with other children.24 Again, however, the children are unfairly
punished because of society's irrational fear that the disease can be spread
through casual contact. The last option would be to admit the children into the
classroom setting with only minimal restrictions. This would allow the children
to become educated in the same setting as other children and would not
compromise the school's need to protect the health of other students.
So which option should schools choose? Obviously, the third option is the
best for both the children and the school for the reasons stated above. Yet, many
schools choose to ban children with any form of AIDS from the public school
system.25 Children and parents are then forced to bring legal action against the
school system to force the school system to allow the children to attend in an
unrestricted setting.
I. CURRENT SOLUTIONS AND THEIR PROBLEMS
Parents and children who have sued to get back into the school system have
based their actions on various statutory and constitutional grounds. The most
common and most successful basis for attack has been Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.26 Many courts have used this Act to prevent schools
from banning children with AIDS from school.27 Other children have based
their actions on the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1976.28
Finally, some of those who have brought actions under the Fourteenth
Amendment as a way of enforcing their right to an education.29 This section
23 Several schools districts chose this option in the mid-1980s. The choice to ban
children ultimately ended up in the courtroom. See Vincent, supra note 10, at 398.
24 0ne court ordered a school system to admit a child with AIDS into a normal
classroom because otherwise the child would experience irreparable harm if the school
continued to keep him in a separate classroom in which he was the only student. See
Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 1002,1005-07 (S.D.
11. 1988); see also Carolyn J. Kasler, Reading, Writing, But No Biting: Isolating School
Children with Aids, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 337, 347 (1989) (explaining the problems
associated with quarantining AIDS victims).
25 See, e.g., Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. & Frederick P. Shaffer, AIDS in the Classroom,
14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 163,165-66 (1985) (two school boards in Queens, New York passed
regulations banning children with AIDS from the school system).
2629 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
27 See, e.g., Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376,381-83 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325,335-37
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
2820 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988).
29 See, e.g., District 27,502 N.Y.S.2d at 337-38.
1994]
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will attempt to set out the basic arguments for each of these and show why
these arguments may not stand the test of time.
A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The most successful argument that children with AIDS have relied on to
preclude states from banning them from school is based upon Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.30 This section reads:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall, solely by
reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
31
Although the Act originally pertained only to employment, courts have used
it to protect the rights of children with AIDS. 32
The principle behind Section 504 is that if a person is a "handicapped
individual," then that person is entitled to federal protection. The seminal case
defining "handicapped individual" is School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.33
In Arline, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue whether a
teacher who had been diagnosed with tuberculosis was a "handicapped
individual" within the meaning of the Act34 The Court analyzed regulations
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services and approved
by Congress.35 The regulations defined "handicapped individual" as a person
with a physical impairment that substantially affects one or more of life's major
activities.36
The school board in Arline argued that contagious diseases do not fall within
the Section 504 definition of handicap. The Court rejected this argument and
stated:
3029 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see Beth A. Krusen, AIDS in the Classroom:
Room for Reason Amidst Paranoia, 91 DICK. L. REv. 1055,1063-64 (1987).
3129 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3 2See, e.g., District 27, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 335-37.
33480 US. 273 (1987).
341d. at 275.
351d. at 279-80.
3645 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2) (1993). The regulations define "physical impairment" as "any
physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss
affecting one or more of the following body systems; neurological; musculoskeletal;
special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine." Id.
§ 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A). "Major life activities" are defined as "functions such as caring for one's
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working." Id. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii).
[Vol. 42".239
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Allowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of a physical
impairment would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of section
504, which is to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied
jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the
ignorance of others.
37
As a basis for this statement, the Court also explained that the possibility of
contagiousness gives rise to "public fear and misapprehension" and that the
Act was designed to "replace such reflexive reactions to actual or perceived
handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically sound judgments."3 8
Many courts have used this language to strike down bans that prohibit
children with AIDS from attending school in a normal setting.39 Basically, the
courts have held that children with AIDS meet the two-factor criteria of
"handicapped individual" as defined by the Rehabilitation Act.40 To be
classified as a handicapped individual under this definition, one must have (1)
a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more of a person's major
life activities and (2) have a record of such an impairment, or be regarded as
having such an impairment.41
The courts have held that individuals who are HIV-positive are "physically
impaired" within the meaning of the Act because the AIDS virus will eventually
strike at the lymphatic and hematic systems.42 Those individuals who are
categorized as having fully developed AIDS also have difficulties with their
respiratory and neurological systems.43 Once a person reaches a certain stage
in the AIDS virus, the person will have difficulty breathing, walking, seeing,
etc., implying that the AIDS virus will eventually substantially limit one or
more of the person's major life activities.44 Thus, the first requirement of the
Act is met.45
The Arline Court stated that the second requirement of having a record of
impairment is met if a person is hospitalized for his or her disease.46
37Arline, 480 U.S. at 284-85.
38Id.
39See, e.g., Thomas v. Atascadero Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376,381-83 (C.D. Cal. 1987);
District 27, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 336-38.
4029 U.S.C. § 706(8)(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
41ld.
42See, e.g., District 27,502 N.Y.S.2d at 336 (stating thatperson with AIDS has "physical
impairment" because disease destroys lymphocytes); see also Vincent, supra note 10, at
407.
43Vincent, supra note 10, at 408.
44Id. at 409. For a definition of "major life activities" see supra note 36.
45Vincent, supra note 10, at 407-08.
46Arline, 480 U.S. at 281. In Arline, the petitioner had been hospitalized for
tuberculosis at one point in her life so she had a record of impairment. Id.
1994]
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Commentators have extended the Court's statement to all medical treatment
indicating that if a person can establish that he or she has sought medical
treatment for AIDS, then that person has a record of impairment-47 The analogy
need not be extended for people who have fully developed AIDS because they
are often hospitalized and would fit within the Arline definition. The analogy
is intended to benefit those who have ARC or who are seropositive. Even if the
analogy is not extended, some commentators argue that individuals who have
ARC or are seropositive are "regarded as" having the disease because they are
discriminated against and deserve the protection of the Act.48
There are several problems with extending Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act to include children with AIDS. Perhaps the most obvious problem is that
the Arline Court expressly refused to address the question whether AIDS
carriers were protected by Section 504.9 The Court could have made a broad
ruling that would allow the lower courts to justify the analogy between
tuberculosis and AIDS, but it chose not to do so.50 One possible reason for this
is that most contagious diseases are treatable, whereas AIDS is not.51 The
potential of harm and death that accompany AIDS, and its current incurability,
distinguishes it from other contagious diseases. Therefore, even if Arline can be
extended to many contagious diseases, arguably it does apply to AIDS.
Another problem with using Section 504 as a basis to protect the rights of
children with AIDS is that the United States Congress has either refused or
neglected to amend the Act to include those diseases that directly affect the
immune system. Congress recently passed the Americans with Disability Act
(hereinafter ADA) and used Section 504 as its standard for defining
"disability".52 Congress did not change the definition found in Section 504 to
include individuals with incurable contagious diseases. This easily could be
construed as legislative intent to exclude persons with AIDS from the
definition. Given that the ADA was meant to give similar protection as Section
4 7 Vincent, supra note 10, at 411.
48See Chickering, supra note 17, at 167; Vincent, supra note 10, at 411; MacFarlane,
supra note 12, at 394-95.
4 9Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.7.
501n an amicus brief the United States argued that Section 504 would not protect
individuals who merely carried a contagious disease such as AIDS. Id. The Court,
however, refused to address the contention that "discrimination solely on the basis of
contagiousness is never discrimination on the basis of a handicap" because the plaintiff
in Arline suffered from both contagiousness and physical impairment. Id. In doing so,
the Court chose not to make a broad ruling that would cover all individuals with AIDS,
including those that are HIV positive but show no physical symptoms.
51See Kasler, supra note 24, at 355.
52See Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An Overview, 22
N.M. L. REv. 13, 18 (1992).
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504,53 Congress should have included AIDS as a handicap within its definition
if it wanted persons with AIDS to be covered.
Finally, all categories of persons with AIDS do not appear to fit the basic
criteria of 'handicapped individuals" as defined by the Rehabilitation Act. Most
would agree that children with fully developed AIDS would fall within the
scope of the Act, but these individuals probably are not "otherwise qualified"5 4
to attend school because they require constant supervision and medical
treatment In contrast, children who are categorized as having ARC or who are
seropositive may be well qualified to attend school in a normal unrestricted
setting, but are these individuals handicapped within the meaning of the Act?
Medical evidence shows that many individuals who test HIV-positive are only
carriers and may never reach the fully-developed stage.55 Arguably, these
individuals are not handicapped because they will never have the typical
"physical impairments" that are associated with the AIDS virus and are not
protected by the Act. These individuals, however, are discriminated against
because they are HIV-positive.
Thus, unless the Supreme Court expressly extends the holding in Arline to
cover AIDS as a contagious disease, or until the U.S. Congress amends the
definition of 'handicapped individual" in the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504
cannot be used as a faultless basis to protect the rights of children with AIDS.
Other bases must be examined.
B. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act
Another statute that has been used to secure the right of children with AIDS
to a public education in an unrestricted setting is the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (hereinafter EAHCA). 56 Similar to Section 504, the
EAHCA will only protect those individuals who fall within the Act's definition
531d. at 104.
54Vincent, supra note 10, at 412 (setting out standard for "otherwise qualified").
55TheArline Court stated in a footnote that it would not address the question whether
a carrier fell within the meaning of the Act. Arline, 480 US. at 282 n.7. The Court
distinguished the petitioner because she was both a carrier and had been physically
impaired within the meaning of the Act for several years. Id. at 276-77, 281-82.
5620 US.C. § 1412(3)[5] (1988). The statute states:
In order to qualify for assistance... a State shall demonstrate ...
that it has established... procedures to assure that, to the maximum
extent appropriate, handicapped children ... are educated with
children who are not handicapped and that special classes, separate
schooling, or other removal of handicapped children from the regular
education environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
handicap is such that education in regular classes ... cannot be
achieved satisfactorily ....
1994]
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of "handicapped".57 As will be shown, the definition of "handicapped" within
the EAHCA is more restrictive than its counterpart in Section 504.58
The primary purpose of the EAHCA is to insure that all children with
disabilities receive "a free, appropriate public education which emphasizes
special education and related services designated to meet their unique
needs."59 This purpose is to be accomplished through the extension of federal
grants to state education departments. 60 The Supreme Court has interpreted
this purpose as meaning that all states which participate in EAHCA programs
must provide free access to a "basic floor of opportunity" education, but not
necessarily access to the "best" educational program.61
To fall within the EAHCA's definition of handicapped, a child must be
mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually
handicapped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically
impaired, other health impaired, deaf-blind, multi-handicapped, or
having specific learning disabilities, who because of those
impairments need special education and related services. 62
The EAHCA defines "other health impaired" as
having limited strength, vitality or alertness, due to chronic or acute
health problems such as a heart condition, tuberculosis, rheumatic
fever, nephritis, asthma, sickle cell anemia, hemophilia, epilepsy, lead
poisoning, leukemia, or diabetes, which adversely affects a child's
educational performance.63
Applying these definitions to children with AIDS, some commentators argue
that children with AIDS are "other health impaired" because the AIDS virus, as
an acute health problem, can lead to a loss of strength and vitality.64 This
application, however, calls for a broad reading of the EAHCA that courts have
not readily accepted.65
57 See District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 339 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1986) ('The pivotal question [under the EAHCA] is whether a child diagnosed
as having AIDS would fall within the definition of a 'handicapped individual'.");
Krusen, supra note 30, at 1079-80.
58 See Krusen, supra note 30, at 1080.
5920 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1988).
6 01d. § 1400(b)(8).
6 1 See Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200-210 (1982).
6234 C.F.R. § 300.5(a) (1991).
63 1d. § 300.5(b)(7)(ii).
6 4Leslie N. Brockman, Enforcing the Right to a Public Education for Children Afflicted
with AIDS, 36 EMORY L.J. 603, 632 (1987).
65 See, e.g., District 27,502 N.Y.S.2d at 339 (stating that while children with AIDS may
become handicapped under EAHCA as their physical condition deteriorates, fact that
[Vol. 42".239
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In District 27 Community School Board v. Board of Education,66 a New York
Superior Court addressed the issue whether the EAHCA protected all children
with AIDS. The court recognized that the EAHCA's definition of handicapped
was more restrictive than Section 504's definition because the purpose of the
EAHCA is not to help all children but only those children with special needs. 67
Given this, the court held that while children may be covered by the EAHCA
if they suffer from the disabling effects of the AIDS virus, children who are
seropositive and do not display symptoms of the disease will not be protected
by the EAHCA. 68
The District 27 decision is a good example of why the EAHCA is not the best
method to be used to protect the rights of children with AIDS. The main
problem with the EAHCA is that it limits itself to those children who are
physically or mentally disabled as a result of the disease. Typically, however,
if the children are physically or mentally disabled, the school system will be
more justified in separating them from the normal classroom setting because
they require extra assistance.69
Another reason why the EAHCA is not the best method of attack is because
the administrative decisionmaking process associated with the Act is both
tedious and time-consuming. 70 Generally, once a child has been diagnosed as
having fully-developed AIDS, that child has less than two years to live.71 Two
years is not that long when one considers that litigants must start out in a board
of education hearing, exhaust their administrative remedies, appeal to a district
court, then work the case through the appellate system.72 In addition, the
person is carrier is not enough to bring child within definition of "handicapped" under
EAHCA).
66502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
6 7 d. at 338.
681d. at 339; Krusen, supra note 30, at 1080.
69 The Center for Disease Control established a set of guidelines to help school
systems make decisions regarding the placement of children with AIDS. The CDC said
that all children should be admitted into the school systems unless the children lack
control over bodily secretions, exhibit aggressive behavior such as biting, or have open
skin sores that cannot be covered. See Center for Disease Control, Education and Foster
Care of Children Infected with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type Ill/
Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 254 JAMA 1430,1434 (1985). Those children who are
physically or mentally disabled will typically fall within one or more of the CDC's
exception categories. Therefore, these children may be restricted from the normal
classroom setting.
7 0Maureen M. Murphy, Special Education Children with HIV Infection: Standards and
Strategiesfor Admission to the Classroom, 19 J.L. & EDuc. 345, 359 (1990).
711d.
72 0ne must recognize that all litigious methods of enforcing rights are
time-consuming, but the EAHCA is particularly slow given that it only protects those
children with AIDS that are already almost dead from the disease.
1994]
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EAHCA has a "stay put" provision stating that the child challenging the
school's placement must remain in the education program that the school
chooses until the child proves that the program violates his right to a free public
education.73 Even though a court may find that the child's right to an education
under the EAHCA was violated, this decision would come after years of
litigation during which the child's right would be continually inhibited.74
Therefore, the EAHCA does not provide the full protection that children with
AIDS need because it is limited to those children who have special needs and
because the enforcement process is so time-consuming with the burden of
proof on the child.
C. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
A third method that has been used to challenge the exclusion of children
with AIDS from the normal classroom setting is the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.7 This challenge has been brought in one of two
forms: either the petitioner argues that his fundamental right to an education
has been infringed or the petitioner argues that she has been discriminated
against on the basis of her disability in violation of the U.S. Constitution.76
If a petitioner challenges a school's placement on the grounds that it violates
his fundamental right to an education, he must show that this right is protected
by the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, has been somewhat
schizophrenic in its evaluation of the importance of education. In Brown v. Board
of Education, 7 the Court stated, "[E]ducation is perhaps the most important
function of state and local government."78 Yet, in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,79 the Court refused to find that the right to an education
7320 US.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1988).
74 See, e.g., Martinez v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, 861 F.2d 1502, 1503-04
(1lthCir. 1988). In Martinez, a seven-year-old mentally retarded girl who was diagnosed
as having ARC spent nearly two years battling in the courts for her rights. Id. Even after
those two years, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not make a ruling on whether
the EAHCA required the school system to place the girl in an unrestricted setting. Id. at
1506-07.
75U.S. CONST. amend. XMV, § 1.
76 See, e.g., Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1525-26 (M.D. Fal. 1987) (stating
that complaint alleged deprivation of right to education and deprivation of equal
protection and due process rights because of discrimination on basis of handicap).
77347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78 Id. at 493.
79411 U.S. 1 (1973).
[Vol. 42".239
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss2/5
CHILDREN WITH AIDS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
is a fundamental right protected by the U.S. Constitution.80 Given the Court's
ruling in Rodriguez, a petitioner is forced to find another basis for protection.
Many commentators have suggested that the Court should use a Plyler v.
Doe81 type of analysis when examining the exclusion of children with AIDS
from the classroom.82 In Plyler, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny 83 and
held that children of illegal aliens could not be barred from attending public
school.84 The primary basis for the Court's rationale was that it did not want
to punish the children for the misdeeds of the parents.85
Applying this rationale to children with AIDS, one could argue that children
who have AIDS are victims of someone else's misdeed. If either the parents of
the child have AIDS or the child contracted AIDS through tainted blood, then
the child had nothing to do with his or her condition, much like the children
of illegal aliens who had no control over their status or the status of their
parents. Thus, because most children with AIDS are not responsible for their
condition and because of the importance of education, the Equal Protection
Clause should prevent these children from being excluded from the public
school system.
The problem with applying Plyler to children with AIDS is two-fold. First,
the Supreme Court has almost expressly stated that Plyler is limited to its
facts. 86 Thus, it would be very difficult to extend the holding to this scenario.
Second, discrimination against children with AIDS has more of a rational basis
than discrimination against children of illegal aliens. School systems are faced
with a public health/safety concern when assessing whether to allow a child
with AIDS into the classroom. Officials do not have the same concerns when
attempting to exclude the children of illegal aliens. Thus, even if Plyler can be
extended, there is a good chance that the Court would find that the exclusion
of children with AIDS is necessary to meet the important goal of preventing
the spread of a deadly disease.
If the petitioner challenges the school's placement on the basis that she is
being discriminated against because of her handicap, she must show that she
8 0 0ne author has suggested adding a right to education provision into the
Constitution to avoid this problem. See BARRY KRUSCH, THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION
173(1992).
81457 U.S. 202 (1982).
82 See Sotto, supra note 21, at 214; MacFarlane, supra note 12, at 421.
83The Court was unwilling to apply strict scrutiny because of its holding in Rodriguez
but was also unwilling to apply rational relation scrutiny because of the importance of
education and because the children were being completely excluded from the school
system. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
841d. at 230.
85Id.
86 See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,459-60 (1988) (refusing to extend
Plyler beyond its "unique circumstances").
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belongs to a class protected by the Constitution.87 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center,88 the Court applied a "rational basis test with a bite"89 and held
that a zoning regulation that discriminated against mentally retarded citizens
was unconstitutional. In essence, the Court held that it was irrational to
discriminate against individuals with disabilities by excluding them from the
neighborhood. 90 As one commentator has written, "The Court would not give
effect to actions which were based on negative attitudes and unsubstantiated
fears about the mentally retarded."91
In applying this reasoning to the exclusion of children with AIDS, the
exclusion of children with AIDS from the normal classroom setting is based
upon irrational and unsubstantiated fears. The Supreme Court's statement in
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline92 that the possibility of contagiousness
brings on "fear and misapprehension" appears to support this argument There
is, however, some rational basis for excluding some children who are infected
with the AIDS virus. Even the Center for Disease Control's guidelines provide
exceptions to the admission of children with AIDS into a normal classroom
setting.93 Therefore, the state's interest in protecting the health of its citizens,
coupled with the fact that the fears that accompany AIDS are not
unsubstantiated in all cases, would probably be enough to get past the
rational-basis-test-with-a-bite standard, and the Fourteenth Amendment
would not provide the necessary protection.
D. Conclusion
The current solutions to the dilemma are not foolproof. The Rehabilitation
Act analysis is based upon a Supreme Court case that the Supreme Court
expressly limited. The EAHCA analysis falters because the Act does not cover
all children with AIDS but only those that have developed mental or physical
problems such that they have special needs. Finally, the Fourteenth
87 See JOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw ch. 16, § I, at 592 (2d ed. 1983)
(stating that strict srutiny applies only when a person belongs in a class set apart by a
"trait which itself seems to contravene established constitutional principles").
88473 U.S. 432 (1985).
89MacFarlane, supra note 12, at419. The Court stated that it was applying the rational
basis standard of scrutiny but still found the zoning regulation to be unconstitutional,
a holding that is almost impossible given the minimal amount of reasoning needed to
support a law under the rational basis test. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. The Court could
not apply strict scrutiny because individuals with disabilities are not a suspect class. Id.
Furthermore, the Court could not apply intermediate scrutiny because this standard is
reserved for quasi-suspect classes like gender and illegitimacy. Id.
90Cleburne, 473 US. at 450. The Court stated that the zoning requirement in this case
"appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." Id.
91MacFarlane, supra note 12, at 420.
92480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987).
93 District 27,502 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
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Amendment protection has been limited in both the area of education and with
regard to individuals with disabilities. Therefore, it will be necessary to analyze
one more possible basis of protection-state constitutions.
IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
State constitutional provisions currently are receiving more attention than
they ever have before. During the 1980s and 1990s, we have seen the United
States Supreme Court carve away at some of the protections that were
established by the Warren Court in the 1950s and 1960s. Because of this,
petitioners have tried to find other avenues to protect individual rights. State
constitutions have become one of the most used avenues.
State constitutions can be used to protect the right of children with AIDS to
have a free public education in the least restrictive setting possible. Courts
could do this by examining the importance of state constitutions, by examining
the importance of the state role in education and public welfare, and by
determining that children with AIDS should be protected by the unique
provisions of state constitutions.
A. The Importance of State Constitutions
As described above, the federal courts have been unwilling to hold that the
right to an education is a fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens.94 The
Supreme Court expressly held in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez95 that the right to an education is not fundamental because it is not
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the United States Constitution.96 Because
of this, federal courts need only apply the rational basis test to determine if the
state's exclusion of children with AIDS surpasses constitutional scrutiny.
Needless to say, individuals are not afforded much protection against state
regulation of education.97
If the federal courts are not willing to protect the education rights of children
with AIDS, then those individuals must look to the state constitutions to find
constitutional protection. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the
federal constitution provides a minimum "floor" of protection.98 State courts
may not provide less protection than that found in the federal constitution, but
94 See text accompanying notes 75-86.
95411 U.S. 1 (1973).
961d. at 30-44.
97 1f one examines the history of the Supreme Court and its rulings regarding
education, it is not difficult to see that the Court will only protect an individual's right
to an education if that individual has been irrationally excluded from the school system.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see also notes 75-86 and accompanying discussion.
98 See Cooper v. California, 386 US. 58,62 (1967).
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state constitutions may afford more protection.99 If a state court bases its
decision on "independent and adquate" state constitutional grounds, and the
decision does not drop protection below that found in the federal constitution,
then the Supreme Court cannot overturn the decision, even if the state court
affords more protection than that afforded by the US. Constitution.10 0 In
essence, decisions based on state constitutional law that provide more
protection than the federal minimum floor are insulated from federal review. 10 1
Because state courts can insulate their decisions from federal review by
relying solely on the state constitution, state constitutions take on a powerful
role in jurisprudence. This role does not diminish in the area of education but
actually takes on a more important part. As will be shown, because the state
and local governments play such a central role in the education of the United
States citizenry, the state constitutions play an equally important role in making
sure the government does it right
B. The Role of the State Government and State Constitutions in Education
Traditionally, state and local governments have controlled the regulation of
both education 102 and public health.l0 With regard to education, states not
only control access to education but also have the responsibility to provide
every child with a free, appropriate education. This responsibility comes from
the fact that every state in the union has a state constitutional provision that
mandates the creation and maintenance of a public educational system.104 In
991d.; see also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (stating
that U.S. Supreme Court decisions do not limit a state's "sovereign right to adopt in its
own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the
Federal Constitution").
10OSee Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983) (reviewing basis for principle
that Court will not review decisions of state courts that rest on independent and
adequate state grounds).
101See Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 81.
102See Annette C. Hamburger, Public Schools and Public Healtv Exdusion of Children
With AIDS, 5 J.L. & POL. 604, 612 (1989).
103See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,203 (1824).
104See ALA. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CoNST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CoNST. art. IX, § 2; CONN.
CONST. art VII, § 1; DEL. CoNsT. art. X, § 1; FLA. CoNST. art X, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CoNsT. art IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art X, § 1; ND. CoNST.
art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 3; KAN. CONST. art VI, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art VIII, § 1; MD. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1; MASs. CoNsT. ch.
5, § 2; MIcH. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 2; Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201;
MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV.
CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. art. LXXXIII; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4(1); N.M. CoNsT.
art. XII § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
OHIO CONST. art VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST.
art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1;
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST.
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addition, the US. Supreme Court has held that if a state creates a public
educational system, the right to attend "is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms."105
Many state courts have used their state constitutions to strike down
discriminatory laws that would survive federal scrutiny. For example, the
disparate school financing scheme that the Supreme Court upheld in Rodriguez
has been struck down in many states because it violated the state
constitution. 106 Many courts have actually gone so far as to declare that the
right to education is fundamental. 107 The basis for these declarations is that,
unlike the federal constitution, the state constitutions expressly define the
importance of education to citizenry. Therefore, state constitutions and state
courts should recognize the fundamental right to an education.
C. Using the State Constitution to Protect the Right of Children with AIDS to a
Public Education
State courts can use the education provisions in state constitutions in one of
two ways. The court could use the provision to heighten the level of scrutiny
under an equal-protection analysis. Alternatively, state courts could declare
that the education provisions in state constitutions carry with them substantive
rights that do not depend on an equal protection analysis. The difference is
subtle but important. If courts find that the right to education provisions have
substantive meaning, children with AIDS become entitled to both access to
education and a certain quality of education.
1. Equal Protection Analysis
The fact that states have constitutional provisions that establish the
importance of education is crucial to constitutional analysis. In Rodriguez the
Supreme Court stated that education was not a fundamental right under the
Equal Protection Clause because it was not explicitly or implicitly mentioned
in the U.S. Constitution. State courts cannot say the same thing about state
constitutions. If one accepts the rationale of Rodriguez, the right to an education
should be fundamental under every state constitution.108 With this, the state
§ 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; Wis.
CONST. art. X, § 3; WYo. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1; see also Allen W. Hubsch, Education and
Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC.
93, 96-101 (1989).
105Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
106Hubsch, supra note 104, at 115-21.
107See, e.g., Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 867 (W. Va. 1979). The Pauley court
determined that "excellence was the goal [for the standard of education], rather than
mediocrity; and that education of the public was intended to be a fundamental function
of the state government and a fundamental right...." Id.
108Hubsch, supra note 104, at 122. The only way that this would not be true is if the
state had a separate constitutional provision that explicitly denied the persons of the
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constitutions become valuable tools to those children with AIDS who are
banned from the public education system because they can use the state
constitutions to enforce their right to an equal education.
The courts that have declared that the right to an education is fundamental
under their state constitution have done so because of the importance of both
an adequate and equal educational opportunity for all citizens of the state.109
The US. Supreme Court also has stressed the importance of equal educational
opportunities with its ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.110 In Brown, the
Court struck down the racially disparate treatment accorded students because
to separate minority children "solely because of their race generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."111 The same can be said about
the effects that exclusion from the normal classroom setting would have on
children with AIDS. Therefore, children with AIDS are entitled to the same
educational opportunity as other children. Under state constitutions, this
entitlement becomes a fundamental right.112
If the right to an equal education is fundamental under the state
constitutions, those state courts that have accepted the federal three-tiered
equal protection scrutiny standards would have to apply the strict scrutiny
standard to any regulation that deprives students of this right.113 If school
officials ban children with AIDS from the normal classroom setting in an effort
to regulate public health, this regulation would violate the students'
fundamental right to an education. Therefore, the burden would fall upon the
state to prove that the ban would be the necessary means to further a
compelling state interest.114
state the right to an education. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 111 ("[N]othing in this
Constitution shall be construed as creating or recognizing any right to education or
training at public expense....'). Some courts have held that disparate financing schemes
are not unconstitutional under the state's equal protection clause because persons who
are impoverished are not a suspect class. See Lujan v. Colorado, 649 P2d 1005, 1022
(Colo. 1982).
109See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 87 (1978); see also Serrano v. Priest,
487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59 (Cal. 1973); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,878 (W. Va. 1979).
110347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1111d. at 494.
112See Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1255-59. In Serrano, the California Supreme Court stated
that "the distinctive and priceless function of education in our society warrants, indeed
compels, our treating it as a fundamental interest." Id. at 1258.
113Most states have accepted the three-tiered standard (strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and rational relation test) and have used the standards to do state
constitutional analysis. See, e.g., Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 763
P.2d 1153, 1157-58 (N.M. 1988) (federal constitutional standards and New Mexico
constitutional standards are the same).
ll 4See NowAK, supra note 87, ch. 16, § I, at 592 (describing strict scrutiny review).
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The United States Supreme Court has said that the protection of the public
health and welfare is a compelling state interest.115 Even with this being true,
however, the state would need to prove that banning the children with AIDS
from school or quarantining the children in school is the least drastic means
available or most narrowly tailored means available for protecting the
compelling interest.116 Looking at all of the possible options, it appears that the
banning or quarantining of all children with AIDS would not pass state
constitutional scrutiny.
According to the Center for Disease Control guidelines, children with AIDS
are not a threat to the health and welfare of other children unless the
H1V-positive children lack control over bodily secretions, exhibit aggressive
behavior such as biting, or have open skin sores that cannot be covered. 117
Given the fact that these guidelines come from a governmental agency, the
maximum that a state could do is ban or quarantine those children that fall
within the CDC exception.118 School systems that attempt to do more than this
could be held civilly liable.119 Therefore, almost all children with AIDS would
be protected from discrimination at school and have the right to attend school
in an unrestricted setting, especially those children who are only seropositive
or have ARC and are not otherwise disabled.
115See Carolene Prods., Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18,23 (1944).
116See NOWAK, supra note 87, ch. 16, § I, at 592.
117See Center for Disease Control, supra note 69, at 1434.
118One commentator cited medical evidence that there really isno risk of transmission
even if a child has a habit of biting. See Schwarz & Shaffer, supra note 25, at 171-72. This
would imply that even some of the children that fit within the CDC exception may be
able to challenge a school's decision to place the children in a more restrictive setting.
Furthermore, those children who do fall within the CDC exception do not lose their
state constitutional equal protection rights and could challenge any placement in a
restrictive setting. Although the school systems may be able to show a compelling state
interest, it is unlikely that the schools could completely ban these children from school.
The children would still enjoy constitutional protection because the right to an education
is fundamental. The school officialswould behard-pressed to show how excluding these
children from school would be less drastic than placing the children in a more restrictive
classroom setting. Although the school officials might argue that a lack of resources
prevents them from placing the children in a restrictive in-school setting, they could not
overcome the fact that lack of resources has never been a valid basis for violating
constitutional rights. In addition, the importance of allowing a child to study in the least
restrictive, social, in-school setting should outweigh any financial concerns that the state
might have. Therefore, these children would also be able to attend school and would
not have to face the real possibility of receiving a sub-standard, discriminatory
education.
119Cf. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376,382 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(holding school district liable for attorney's fees and costs).
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2. Substantive Rights Analysis
Most of the time when state courts rely on state constitutional provisions to
protect rights, the courts are reacting to some "previously articulated federal
doctrines."120 As a result, most state constitutional cases that uphold the right
to an education do so on equal protection grounds because that is what the U.S.
Supreme Court has addressed. 121 There are, however, a few state courts that
have stepped outside of the equal protection analysis and have analyzed state
education provisions as substantive rights. By doing this, the state courts
guarantee rights independent of, and additional to, the equal protection
guarantees.
The seminal case in this area is Pauley v. Kelly.122 In Pauley, the West Virginia
Supreme Court analyzed the history of its education article and determined
that "excellence was the goal rather than mediocrity."123 The Court concluded
that, based on the history of the provision and precedent case law, the West
Virginia Constitution required both a certain level of equality and a certain level
of quality in education.124 In essence, the court made it mandatory for the state
legislature to develop and implement educational quality standards that
would assure a meaningful education to all of the school-age citizens of the
state.
Other state courts have also declared that the education provisions of their
constitutions have substantive meaning.125 In holding that its state education
article had substantive meaning, the Washington Supreme Court declared:
The constitutional right to have the State "make ample provision for
the education of all [resident] children" would be hollow indeed if the
possessor of the right could not compete adequately in our open
political system, in the labor market, or in the market place of ideas.126
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court gave its education article substantive
meaning when it stated, '"he Constitution's guarantee must be understood to
120Hubsch, supra note 104, at 94.
12 11d. at 127. Mr. Hubsch notes that many of the plaintiff's in right to education
litigation "have presented the education article claims as surrogates for equal protection
claims-suggesting that the state constitutional languagewhich addresses itself directly
to quality should be read to require equality." Id.
122255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
123 Id. at 867.
1241d. at 869. The court found that the state constitution required the state to provide
a system that "develops, as best the state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies
and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful and happy occupations,
recreation and citizenship.:' Id. at 877.
125 See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273,291-95 (NJ. 1973); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 585 P.2d 71,85 (Wash. 1978).
126 Seattle Sch. Dist., 585 P.2d at 94.
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embrace that educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary
setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor
market."127 Thus, the courts that have given their education articles substantive
meaning have done so on the basis that quality of education is just as important
as equality of education.
The substantive right to education can be used as both an alternative and as
an additional remedy to the equal protection right to education. The Robinson
Court used the New Jersey education article as an alternative to the equal
protection analysis when it held that substantively the article required the state
to provide both an equal education and a quality education to all of the students
in the state.128 The Court did not even attempt to do a three-tiered equal
protection analysis to reach this conclusion. Therefore, courts can forego the
standard fundamental right/equal protection analysis and, in the alternative,
find that the education article of the state constitution mandates that the state
give both an equal education and a quality education.
In contrast, courts can use the education articles to add to the rights that
would be granted through an equal protection analysis. In Seattle School District
No. I v. State the court appeared to use the Washington education article in this
manner.129 The Court did somewhat of an equal protection type analysis to
declare that the state's school financing system was unconstitutional.130 Then,
the Court used the state education article to support their holding that all
children are entitled to a certain quality of education.131 In this way, the Court
used the education article to provide rights that were in addition to those rights
guaranteed by equal protection.
Children with AIDS benefit from this substantive type of analysis for two
reasons. First, by using the substantive right as an alternative to equal
protection analysis, the children can argue that they cannot be denied access to
education. As an alternative to the equal protection right, the substantive right
would guarantee both an equal education and a quality education for all
children. Banning children with AIDS from school would violate the state
education article because it would deny children with AIDS access to an equal
education. A court could not say that all children have a right to free public
education and then deny that right to children with AIDS. School officials may
argue that they can provide the children with a quality education outside the
school system; however, as the Supreme Court stated in Brown, separating
children from the classroom denies those children of an equal education
127Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295.
12 8See id. at 283 (stating that the court'l"esitate[s] to turn this case upon the State equal
protection clause").
129Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,585 P.2d at 91-95.
1301d. at 92 (discussing right to education as "constitutionally paramount"). The
Court's use of the language "constiutionally paramount" is similar to calling the right
to education fundamental.
1311d. at 94.
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because it "generates a feeling of inferiority... in a way unlikely ever to be
undone."132 Therefore, if the articles have substantive meaning the schools
should have to provide children with AIDS access to public education.
Second, if the state education articles have substantive meaning and are used
as a way of creating additional rights to the equal protection guarantees,
children with AIDS can argue that they have a right to a certain quality of
education. The West Virginia, Washington, and New Jersey courts have held
that schools are required to give students a certain quality of education so that
the students could perform adequately in society.133 Children with AIDS could
argue that a ban or quarantine would violate their substantive right to an
education because they would not be in an environment that is of a quality
most conducive to their learning. States could argue that these children would
actually be given a higher quality education because they would be receiving
one-on-one contact in their homes or a better ratio of contact in a restricted
classroom setting. This argument, however, ignores the fact that exclusion still
creates a feeling of inferiority, as stated in Brown, and ignores the fact that
although the children may become 'book smart," they will not learn how to
function in society. How can these children learn to perform adequately in
society if society excludes them from participating? The truth is these children
will not be adequately prepared to enter the labor force or to participate in
society unless they are placed in a non-restrictive setting and allowed to learn
along side other students.
D. Conclusion
State constitution education articles can be used to protect the right to
education for children with AIDS in two ways. First, the state courts could use
the education article as a surrogate for the equal protection clause. Then,
children with AIDS cannot be denied equal access to education. Second, the
state courts could give the education articles substantive meaning. Then,
children with AIDS are guaranteed both access to education and a certain
quality of education.
The legal benefits of using the state constitutions to protect the rights of
children with AIDS are twofold. First, by using the state constitution to
establish the fundamental right of education, petitioners ensure that all
children will receive an equal and adequate education. Second, if courts rely
on their state constitutions rather than other statutory or constitutional
grounds, their decisions will be insulated from federal review or legislative
amendment, and the decisions have a better chance of weathering the test of
time.
132347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). Although Brown did apply to exclusions based on race,
exclusions based on disability would generate the same feelings of inferiority.
13 3See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 291-95 (N.J. 1973); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
State, 585 P.2d 71, 85 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979).
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The practical benefits of allowing children with AIDS to attend school in an
unrestricted setting are plentiful. The student is allowed to study with other
children in an open social environment. This gives the child the opportunity to
grow both intellectually and socially and prevents the child from feeling
ostracized and unwanted. Further, the school system benefits because it does
not have to spend the resources that would be necessary to educate the child
at home or in a restrictive setting.134 Additionally, other children benefit
because it gives them a first-hand chance to learn more about the frightening
disease. As the children and school system become more educated about AIDS,
the fear and misapprehension surrounding the disease that causes
discrimination should disappear.
V. CONCLUSION
Throughout history only a few diseases have caused more public animosity
and fear than AIDS. The most unfortunate victims of this public unrest are the
children who become infected with this deadly disease. These children face
exclusion or quarantine from many activities and organizations, one of which
is the public school system.
Much has been done to try to protect the right to an education for these
children. Many courts have held that the children are handicapped as defined
by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and are entitled to the protection
of that Act. Other courts have used the Education of All Handicapped Children
Act to protect the interests of those children with AIDS that have special needs.
Finally, some courts and commentators have held or argued that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes states from
excluding children with AIDS from the school system.
Yet, each of the above approaches has inherent problems. All have
limitations that preclude them from protecting all of the children with AIDS to
the fullest extent possible. In addition, arguments based on any of these
grounds require the tenuous extension of legal concepts that the Supreme
Court and the U.S. Congress have neglected to or are unwilling to make. A more
stable means of protecting the rights of children is needed.
The constitutions of each state provide more stable grounds for the
protection of children with AIDS. Every state has a section or article that
recognizes that importance and necessity of education.135 State courts have
used these clauses either to declare that the right to education is fundamental
through an equal protection analysis or to declare that the right is substantive
and that children are entitled to both equal education and to a certain quality
of education. Because of this, children with AIDS should have the right to
attend school in the least restrictive setting possible.
134 See Emily Couric, A New "Class" For School Law, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 15, 1986, at 1
(discussing the financial bind that many schools face in terms of hiring and retaining
teachers).
135See supra note 104.
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What is important to recognize is that even if children with AIDS are allowed
into the school system, this will not necessarily end the discrimination against
them. They will still face some difficulties because of fears based on the
misinformation that surrounds AIDS. Allowing children with AIDS into the
public school system, however, will be the first step in breaking down the
barriers of misapprehension and fear. Once children with AIDS are freely
admitted into the school system, other children will become educated about
the disease, and discrimination should fall by the wayside.
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